Hallucination and Its Objects

When one hallucinates a flying pig, one does not see a flying pig, because there are no flying pigs to be seen. But there is considerable pressure to admit that one nonetheless sees (or, at least, is aware of) some thing. That pressure can either be resisted, or else a suitable object of hallucination can be identified. The large philosophical literature on hallucination has recently tended toward to the first option, but the second retains some notable supporters. This is symptomatic of a serious dilemma: an object of hallucination is hard to resist, but finding a plausible candidate has proved well-nigh impossible.In the first part of this article (sections 1-4), we review and rein-force this dilemma. In the second part, we argue for taking the second horn, and introduce our candidate for the object of hallucination. On our account, the hallucinator is aware of a physical object, albeit some-times not a familiar one.