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EnglishWhat is our experience, namely the conscious mind? This paper puts forward an empirical hypothesis that is akin to the traditional mind-body identity theory. However, in the suggested view, the physical candidate is the external object rather than neural processes. In a nutshell, one’s experience of an object is identical with the object one experiences. For instance, when I perceive an apple, the claim is that the thing that is my experience of the apple is the apple itself. It is an empirical hypothesis because it is based on a purely physical ontology – everything is an object – and it is amenable of empirical prediction. In short, it is falsifiable. In this paper, I will distinguish two cases: standard and nonstandard perception. Standard perception occurs whenever the perceived object is plainly available to be perceived – I perceived an apple and that apple is in front of me. Nonstandard perception occurs whenever what one perceives is not obviously there – as it happens in hallucinations, dreams, illusions, Charles Bonnett’s syndrome, direct brain stimulation, migraine aura, and so forth. A widespread tradition has kept apart the two cases. In contrast, here I will argue that the difference is only of practical nature and that a unified approach is available. I will outline a strategy to find a proper physical object in both cases.
Una teoria dell'identità mente-oggetto, 2016.
| Autori: | MANZOTTI, RICCARDO |
| Data di pubblicazione: | 2016 |
| Titolo: | Una teoria dell'identità mente-oggetto |
| Rivista: | |
| Nazione editore: | Italy |
| Editore: | Il Mulino |
| Fascicolo: | 2 |
| Pagina iniziale: | 207 |
| Pagina finale: | 240 |
| Numero di pagine: | 34 |
| Revisione (peer review): | esperti anonimi |
| IF: | con ISI Impact Factor |
| Rilevanza: | nazionale |
| Lingua: | Italian |
| Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | http://dx.doi.org/10.12832/85412 |
| Settore Scientifico Disciplinare: | Settore M-FIL/01 - Filosofia Teoretica |
| Keywords: | identity theory; mind-body problem; consciousness; hallucinations; illusions; physicalism. |
| Abstract: | What is our experience, namely the conscious mind? This paper puts forward an empirical hypothesis that is akin to the traditional mind-body identity theory. However, in the suggested view, the physical candidate is the external object rather than neural processes. In a nutshell, one’s experience of an object is identical with the object one experiences. For instance, when I perceive an apple, the claim is that the thing that is my experience of the apple is the apple itself. It is an empirical hypothesis because it is based on a purely physical ontology – everything is an object – and it is amenable of empirical prediction. In short, it is falsifiable. In this paper, I will distinguish two cases: standard and nonstandard perception. Standard perception occurs whenever the perceived object is plainly available to be perceived – I perceived an apple and that apple is in front of me. Nonstandard perception occurs whenever what one perceives is not obviously there – as it happens in hallucinations, dreams, illusions, Charles Bonnett’s syndrome, direct brain stimulation, migraine aura, and so forth. A widespread tradition has kept apart the two cases. In contrast, here I will argue that the difference is only of practical nature and that a unified approach is available. I will outline a strategy to find a proper physical object in both cases. |
| Numero degli autori: | 1 |
| Supporto: | A stampa |
| Appare nelle tipologie: | 1.01 Articolo in rivista |
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| File | Descrizione | Tipologia | Licenza | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Manzotti - 2016 - Una teoria dell'identità mente-oggetto.pdf | Articolo principale | N/A | Open Access Visualizza/Apri |
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