It is well known that a symmetric game has only symmetric( pure strategy) Nash equilibria if its best-reply correspondences admit only increasing selections and its strategy sets are totally ordered. Several nonexamples of the literature show that this result is generally false when the totality condition of the relation that orders the strategy sets is simply dropped. Making use of the structure of interaction functions, this note provides sufficient conditions for the symmetry of all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria in symmetric games where best-reply correspondences admit only increasing selections, but strategy sets are not necessarily totally ordered.

A note on the symmetry of all Nash equilibria in games with increasing best replies, 2015.

A note on the symmetry of all Nash equilibria in games with increasing best replies

SACCO, PIERLUIGI
2015-01-01

Abstract

It is well known that a symmetric game has only symmetric( pure strategy) Nash equilibria if its best-reply correspondences admit only increasing selections and its strategy sets are totally ordered. Several nonexamples of the literature show that this result is generally false when the totality condition of the relation that orders the strategy sets is simply dropped. Making use of the structure of interaction functions, this note provides sufficient conditions for the symmetry of all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria in symmetric games where best-reply correspondences admit only increasing selections, but strategy sets are not necessarily totally ordered.
Inglese
2015
Springer
13
Germany
internazionale
esperti anonimi
senza ISI Impact Factor
A stampa
Settore SECS-P/01 - Economia Politica
2
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10808/13429
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